ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
For more than 2,000 years, the idea of democracy, which had been originally invented in ancient Greece, had not found favorable conditions to evolve and endure its contests with political systems like centralized monarchy, hereditary aristocracy, and oligarchy. During the European Enlightenment, the 18 th century philosophic movement rejected traditional social, religious, and political ideas, and the intellectual foundations of modern constitutional and representative democracy were laid. The promotion of democratic institutions were strongly supported by the ideas of John Locke and Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, who both believed in a republican government based on the consent of the governed (Locke, 1963; Montesquieu, 1952 ). Montesquieu's concept of separated and balanced powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government helped to form the philosophical basis for the U.S. Constitution and, consequently, became a role model for constitutional representative democracies throughout the world.
During the last 250 years, a variety of theoretical models of democracy has been introduced, discussed, supported, and opposed by political scientists and philosophers (Barber, 1984; Dahl, 1956; Held, 1996; Pateman, 1970; Przeworski, 1999; Rousseau, 1968; Schumpeter, 1942) . Among the more prominent theoretical concepts of democracy, the concept of deliberative democracy has gained enormous public attention parallel to a declining trust in democratic governments in Western democracies and the global wide-spreading of the Internet (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Dryzek, 2000; Elster, 1998; Fishkin, 1991; Habermas, 1996; Shapiro, 2003; Van Aaken et al., 2004) .
Linking theories of further evolution of information and communication technology with contemporary theories in the area of democratic governance and democracy created the concept of e-government, describing the use of technology by government agencies to enhance the access to and the delivery of governmental services for the benefit of citizens, business partners, and employees (Heeks, 2001) . Around the globe, various different definitions of e-government can be found that generally contain goals of more efficient operations, of better quality of services, and increased and better quality of citizen participation in democratic processes (Andersen, 2004; Grönlund, 2002) . Looking at definitions in use, there currently seems to be a shift from government to governance, which rather implies a wider and more social view than government electronic services to citizens. In this paper we follow the approach that clusters e-government research into two different fields.
E-administration refers to the transformation of governmental services in order to meet the needs and expectations of citizens and to optimize the internal processes of public administration. This should lead to a reduction of internal processing time, an enhancement of internal communications in the administration, together with cost reduction, the identification of new outsourcing opportunities, the generation of more flexibility, and lower response times of administrative bodies (Heeks, 2002; Mahrer, 2002; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) .
E-democracy (also referred to as digital democracy or Internet democracy) addresses the transformation of political systems by means of technology (Agren, 2001; Gisler, 2000; Grönlund, 2002; Merz, 2001; Schedler, 2000) and is generally regarded as a tool for abandoning the representative system for one with a more direct citizen engagement (Becker, 2001; Browning, 2002; Davis et al., 2002; Grönlund, 2001) .
By providing substantial empirical evidence, previous research demonstrates that, contrary to the success of projects in the field of e-administration proposed by e-government strategies around the globe, there is a fundamental lack of empirical evidence concerning the effects or even the progress of proposed e-democracy projects (United Nations, 2003) . To date, the total amount of e-democracy projects compared to the total amount of e-administration projects within different e-government initiatives is negligible (Agren, 2001; Anttiroiko, 2001; Betz & Bargmann, 2003; Wilhelm, 2000) . Facing this imbalance, it is questioned why, with all these initiatives, politicians are only addressing e-democracy as a rhetorical promise as the implementation of e-democracy projects is undertaken at a much slower pace and with dramatically less support than the implementation of other so-called e-administration activities in the public sector (Anttiroiko, 2001; Coleman, 1999; Moore, 1999) .
Recent research findings add a new dimension to existing theories on the hesitant evolution of e-democracy, which clearly identifies politicians as an inhibiting factor (Mahrer & Krimmer, 2004) . After the identification of the notion of the middleman paradox, the research in this paper consequently attempts to explore further this newly discovered phenomenon. By widening the research focus from the Austrian national level (where the middleman paradox has been observed for the first time) to the national level of all 25 EU member countries, we significantly add to this new dimension existing theories on the limping evolution of e-democracy. We have structured the paper in the following way: First, our theoretical framework concerning the fields of political science, e-government, and e-democracy is discussed. Second, after describing our research objectives and the adoption of an exploratory research design, we present the findings of our multiple case study and the crosscase analysis. Third, we discuss our findings and relate them to contemporary theories of democracy and e-democracy evolution.
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
Commonly, democracy is defined as a form of government in which ordinary citizens may take part in governing (Held, 1996) . Besides various ideal models of democracy, contemporary democratic theory sometimes describes the modern type of large-scale democratic government as polyarchal democracy (Dahl, 1956 (Dahl, , 1971 (Dahl, , 1989 . The concept of polyarchal democracy qualifies a political system with six democratic institutions in place, which are considered as the minimal requirements for a democratic country: elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship. As the size of a political unit to be governed matters, these six democratic institutions are necessary for largescale democracies to guarantee effective participation, control over the political agenda, voting equality, enlightened understanding, and full inclusion (Dahl, 1989) .
History has shown that these institutions do not arrive in a country all at once and that, over time, some of these institutions remain highly fragile and vulnerable. Democracy seems to require underlying conditions to guarantee its survival and further evolution. Dahl (1998) describes three essential conditions for polyarchal democracy -control of military and police by elected officials; democratic beliefs and political culture; and no strong foreign control hostile to democracy -as well as two favorable conditions for democracy -a modern market economy and society and weak subcultural pluralism.
Depending on more or less favorable conditions and their individual histories, polyarchal democracies throughout the world are facing an array of different challenges. Especially in Western countries, more people than ever have the right to vote, but fewer than at any time in the history of universal suffrage choose to do so. Declining popular faith in parliaments and other institutions of democratic representation is observed more frequently as citizens' participation is reduced to a few seconds of power in the polling booth (Coleman, 2003) . The whole portfolio of severe and complex challenges and opportunities that The Internet has been the subject of many discussions on how to deal with these challenges and how to further influence the evolution of modern large-scale representative democracy. Expectations range from the development of a virtual agora to involving citizens (Barber, 1998a (Barber, , 1998b Gilder, 2000; Rheingold, 1993) to the fact that the Internet appears to enlarge the inequalities of the digital divide within information-rich and information-poor environments (Golding, 1996; Haywood, 1995) . At present, the effects of the Internet on different western democracies are still in their very early stages. Nevertheless, political observers raise an ever-increasing number of challenging questions concerning the impact the Internet could have on the concept of polyarchal democracy, Toying with the idea of deliberation, is there still a need for experts (politicians) to balance society's different interests? Will direct democracies replace representative democracies? Will we experience a broadening of the spectrum of the politically engaged population? Will we experience a fragmentation of the sense of community and legitimacy that underpins central governments and central parliaments (Applebaum, 2002; Levin, 2002; Morris & Ogan, 1996; Nugent, 2001; Nye Jr., 2002; Schlossberg & Dryzek, 2002; Thompson, 2002) ? Empiricallygrounded and theoretically-satisfying insights addressing these questions remain elusive.
However, the concept of e-democracy seems to offer a feasible path to further explore these questions, as it is founded on the idea of streamlining political communications and altering aspects of political decision making in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of democracy (Browning, 1996; Gross, 2002; Hague & Loader, 1999; Mahrer & Brandtweiner, 2004; Schuler, 2001; Watson & Mundy, 2001) .
Currently, governments are following a "services-first-and-democracy-later" approach to e-government (Clift, 2002) , as digital citizen participation remains patchy and uneven in all countries around the globe, with its full potential under-utilized according to recent research findings (United Nations, 2003 ). An OECD report published in 2003 on promise and problems of e-democracy has identified an array of barriers and has defined a set of future challenges (Macintosh, 2003) : coping with the problem of scale; building capacity and active citizenship; ensuring coherence throughout the policy-making progress; evaluating the benefits and impacts of offering digital citizen engagement; and ensuring government commitment.
Most recent research findings on the further advancement of e-democracy have identified a phenomenon called the "middleman paradox" (Mahrer & Krimmer, 2004) , which opened a new perspective in addition to existing literature and theory in the area of e-democracy and political support and commitment for e-government (Chadwick & May, 2003; Jensen, 2003; Macintosh, 2003; Margetts & Dunleavy, 2002; Øystein & Hallgeir, 2004) .
The middleman paradox illustrates that there are different levels of support for a variety of concepts within e-government with politicians explicitly and implicitly fostering all activities in the area of e-administration but otherwise interfering explicitly and implicitly in the advancement of e-democracy. More precisely, these findings show that the more citizen participation specific concepts of e-democracy that were suggested, the less support for these concepts would be provided by politicians. Possibly, reasons for the politicians' approach can be grouped into two clusters: collective opposition to change and personal fear of change. These attitudes come with a strong belief in the concept of representative democracy and political elitism, with a firm opposition to further political deliberation and a widespread collective, distinctive skepticism concerning all forms of direct and/or digital political participation of the common citizen. In addition, a rejection of any change in the current balance of power as well as a prevalent concern in possible future dispensability could be identified among the politicians (Mahrer & Krimmer, 2004) .
As the emergent concept of the middleman paradox had been based exclusively on Austrian data, the next step consequentially was to expand the research focus to all 25 member countries of the European Union. In order to be consistent with the research framework and the overall design of the study, the research question remained unchanged: Are politicians promoting the further evolution of e-democracy to a much lesser extent than they are promoting the evolution of e-administration, and, if so, why?
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Widening the focus of our research from the Austrian perspective to cover all 25 member countries of the European Union, the research team decided to continue with the exploratory research approach. We continued, following a case research design that provided us with the opportunity to engage in theory building in an area in which there has been little prior research (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 1987) . At this stage of our research, having observed the middleman paradox only in one country, we were still as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test (Eisenhardt, 1989) .
Focusing on parliamentarians as members of the political system, we set up a multiple case study design using a theoretical replication logic (Yin, 1994) . As the case study approach refers to an in-depth study or investigation of a contemporary phenomenon using multiple sources of evidence within its real-life context, it would be the most appropriate method of collecting data within the political system to find answers to our research question.
During the data collecting phase for all national cases, we used multiple methods, including documentation, archival records, protocols, minutes, reports, speeches, and interviews, as well as in some cases internal discussion papers of different political parties. As our main source of information, we carried out 220 semi-structured, open-ended interviews to provide for focus, reliability, and increased validity (Yin, 1994) . These interviews were conducted with members of 25 national unicameral or bicameral parliaments. We selected parliamentarians from both government and opposition parties. The participants were informed about the research team's understanding of e-government and its separation into the fields of e-administration and e-democracy using the definitions described in the introduction of the paper. Afterward, the participants were encouraged to share their personal views, experiences, and interpretations of the current e-government discussion. During the interview, the participants were also asked to focus on the relationship of e-administration and e-democracy, their reflection on the further evolution of these concepts, and its influences on the basically required democratic institutions. The interviews lasted between 60 and 120 minutes with a majority lasting 90 minutes. Two-person teams conducted the interviews in English, with one researcher handling the interview questions and the other recording notes and observations. We used this common and successful procedure for undertaking interviews in case study research to obtain valid data, since a lot of members of parliament would not permit recording (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988) . The research team built a case study database after it had transcribed the interviews to be able to manage the voluminous data and to allow all members of the research team to review all data collected directly.
Given the size of this pan-European research project, the research team employed multiple investigators. Their employment enhanced the creative potential of the study and enhanced confidence in our findings by the convergence of their observations, knowing that conflicting views could deter our research from premature closure (Eisenhardt, 1989) . In order to add richness and depth to our research findings, we tried to combine as many methods as possible. The collection of written or printed In an attempt to produce persuasive and insightful conclusions, the research team combined different techniques during the analytical phase. Analytical memos, based on our researchers' field notes that recorded the results of the tentative analyses, were written at regular intervals (Barley, 1990 ). For the initial data analyses we separated the research team into two groups. One group used open coding procedures and the other group used template analysis coding procedures in order to make sure that one part of the research team had no idea what the data categories would be (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) . The other group started their coding using the research template (King, 1998) . The material on hand was coded separately by both groups and their analyses were compared afterwards.
After having finished the within-case analyses of the different national parliaments, a cross-case analysis was carried out to cover all 25 cases to search for cross case patterns using divergent techniques. The usage of multiple and different types of data from a wide selection of sources provided triangulation and increased the overall reliability of our study (Miles & Huberman, 1984) . We looked for similarities and differences among the 25 cases during one stage of the cross-case analysis. During a second round, we tried another analysis and divided the data by data source to go beyond primarily impressions (Eisenhardt, 1989) . Maneuvering within a grounded theory framework, the research team iterated between the empirical data and possible theoretical conceptualization (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) . The development of conjectures gave us the opportunity to compare systematically our emergent concept with the evidence from each of the 25 cases in order to assess how well or how poorly it fit with the data. In confirmation of our findings, we started to compare our emergent concept with existing literature on different models of democracy and the evolution of e-democracy in order to enhance internal validity and to further sharpen our final concept.
CASE BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION
Initiated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, democracy's "third wave" (Huntington, 1991) EU countries have employed a nearly similar type of large-scale polyarchal democratic government.
These systems of checks and balances among executive, legislative, and judicial branch are based on a written constitution, with the exception of the United Kingdom. Although all 25 EU countries operate on a representative parliamentarian system, due to the constitutional design of their parliaments, the total number of inhabitants, and the number of parliamentarians, the proportion of inhabitants per parliamentarian varies greatly among these countries, as shown in Table 1 .
Forms of direct democracy through participation in referenda on the national level can be found in 20 member countries, ranging from obligatory referenda based on the constitution to only consultative referenda, if proposed by the parliament. At least one form of direct participation can be found within all 25 countries. Throughout the EU, citizens can elect their national legislative branches by popular vote in a unicameral system. In all 12 countries with a bicameral parliamentarian system, popular vote is established for the chamber with the significant legislative powers. A comparison of the major elements of direct participa- Table 2 .
Within these differently operating political systems, which are based on older as well as much younger democratic pillars, the e-government programs of the member countries of the EU are embedded. All e-government efforts are dominated by the European Commission's e-Europe initiative and its predecessors, focusing nearly entirely on the field of e-administration (EC, 1994 (EC, , 1997 (EC, , 1999 (EC, , 2002 .
Even in the most current e-government communiqués of the European Commission, e-democracy is addressed, but only very vaguely; it states that the Internet has enabled new forms of citizen involvement in policy-making and that citizens throughout Europe are calling for more transparency and democratic involvement (EC, 2003) . Whereas, for the area of e-administration, detailed action plans can be found for the area of e-democracy, these action plans are missing completely.
CASE FINDINGS
In the following section of this paper, we are primarily analyzing the findings of the cross-case analysis. In presenting evidence through specific examples and individual comments that we have gathered during the interview process, we explain our research findings. These findings are related to the two opposing aspects of the research question as well as to the phenomenon of the middleman paradox in order to make the discussion more meaningful.
Parliamentarians and E-Administration
Members of parliaments throughout all member countries of the EU are well informed about e-government. Nearly all of them are aware of the EU's e-Europe program. They know a lot about its e-administration focus, the opportunities it is offering, and the challenges that have to be faced in order to reach its full potential. The majority of the parliamentarians view limited Internet access, low level of computer literacy, and security problems as the main barriers to e-administration. Still, all across Europe politicians are confident that, in the long run, these problems will be solved by combined panEuropean and national efforts. However, beside these unison praises for the positive effects of e-administration, differences among motives of the parliamentarians coming from old and new democracies could be observed.
For parliamentarians coming from older democracies (all of them have at least been established prior to the fall of the Iron Curtain), e-administration is primarily a tool to improve the overall performance of public administrations and to reduce very old and unnecessary bureaucracy. With the exception of the Scandinavian EU member countries, these goals seem only to be secondary to the majority of parliamentarians in Western Europe. Their prior interest is not to improve the system of public administration but to regain popular faith. A member of the Italian chamber of deputies described the situation representatively: A large number of parliamentarians from the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary commented that e-administration offered their governments the opportunity to totally rebuild administrative processes right from scratch. A Hungarian member of parliament noted more straightforwardly:
"If the public sector wants to be competitive we need competitive public institutions and processes. For us this means that we need totally new institutions and processes. We have to abandon old communist torpor by introducing a fast, efficient, and cost saving Internet-based administration."
Comparing parliamentarians from Western Europe to their colleagues from Eastern Europe, e-administration relates primarily to organizational and cultural change within the administrative system. For them, the support of e-administration is an opportunity for finally leaving behind Communist bureaucracy and corruption. Naturally for the parliamentarians in Eastern Europe, the transformation of their public administrations is not only reasonable but necessary.
Parliamentarians and E-Democracy
Generally, parliamentarians across Europe notice that they are "very much interested in the concepts of e-democracy," that these concepts are "promising" and "should be further explored in the future." They praise the EU's and their national governments' official e-government white papers and strategies and their remarks on e-democracy. When discussing the merits of e-democracy during the interviews, only parliamentarians from former communist countries explicitly stated that, for them, it is "a noteworthy concept" but "far away from implementation." A member of the Czech parliament noticed:
"Leaving the dark age of communism behind us we have already made fantastic progress towards a brighter future. We have established democracy only within a few years. But still it is young -a baby to say so -and it needs practical instruments to strengthen its institutions. Currently information technology is no such practical instrument."
The rationale behind this view was described with other more important tasks waiting on the political agenda. A Polish member of parliament stated: When it comes to discussing more direct citizen participation by digital means, the parliamentarians throughout Europe would name a lot of reasons and barriers that would hinder the implementation of edemocracy. During the interviews, the majority described the same barriers they had already noticed when discussing barriers for e-administration. Contrary to the previous discussion, in the case of e-democracy, the parliamentarians viewed that there were little chances to overcome these barriers. When asked about the reasons for the change in their path of argumentation, the politicians were very reserved about sharing their true position. A significant , Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.
number of parliamentarians tried to argue that they strongly believed in representative democracy and its institutions and that more direct citizen participation "would erode these institutions." Moving down the path of the interviews, the majority of parliamentarians noticed that "people really do not want to be informed"; "they are not interested in political discussion"; "citizens are unqualified"; and "they are not able to handle complexity." Another set of arguments addressed the topic of balance of power. The majority of parliamentarians strongly opposed any changes in the balance of power toward the "uninformed" and "ignorant" citizen. They argued that in such a case, a well-educated and informed minority would dominate digital decision making. Furthermore, parliamentarians noticed that with more direct digital participation, they would have to question their own role as "democracy's experts" and "elites." In the end, the majority of parliamentarians also admitted that they were concerned about their personal role in the future in e-democracy scenarios with direct digital citizen participation. For them, "concepts of e-democracy that are highlighting the displacement of political representation are threatening."
The Middleman Paradox
Summarizing the findings of our interviews, it is evident that throughout the European Union, the majority of parliamentarians are opposing e-democracy. Our observations confirmed all findings that had been presented when the notion of the middleman paradox was introduced for the first time (Mahrer & Krimmer, 2004): • There are different levels of support for different concepts of e-government.
• Parliamentarians are explicitly and implicitly fostering all e-administration activities.
• Parliamentarians are explicitly and implicitly interfering in the advancement of e-democracy.
• The more direct citizen participation in specific concepts of e-democracy is suggesting less support for these concepts will be provided by politicians.
• In addition to these findings, we observed particular variations, depending on the age and actual state of different democracies.
• The longer democratic institutions have been established in a country, the more opposition against different concepts of e-democracy could be observed.
• The longer democratic institutions have been established in a country, the more parliamentarians seem to believe that a maximum level of democracy has already been accomplished and that these institutions have served the country quite well and need no further evolution.
• The longer democratic institutions have been established in a country, the more widespread the opinion of parliamentarians seems to be that the future challenges of democracy will be best faced with the democratic institutions at hand. Also, some type of north-south difference regarding the geographic regions in Europe was observed. It seems that parliamentarians in the Scandinavian and Baltic states as well as in Ireland and Great Britain are opposing concepts of e-democracy to a lesser extent than their colleagues from all other EU member countries:
• Only in these countries did we notice that the parliamentarians recognized at least some basic need to stimulate fur-ther development of democratic institutions in order to strengthen these very same institutions.
• Parliamentarians from these countries also noted that they were observing a substantial and widespread discussion about their country's democratic institutions in the press.
• Only in Scandinavian countries did parliamentarians suggest to very actively look into e-democracy and its benefits as well as to look into the opportunities more direct citizen participation would offer.
Although this study did not focus on business drivers and technology drivers for the further evolution of e-democracy, it should be mentioned that underlying economic conditions, which are linked to these drivers and are of critical importance for the stability of democratic institutions, have been intensely associated by parliamentarians with their support for e-administration throughout the interviews in all EU member countries. In direct association with edemocracy, these drivers and underlying economic conditions were hardly ever mentioned.
Concerning the possibly true motivations and reasons for the significantly lower level of support for concepts of e-democracy than for concepts of e-administration, we made the same observations on the European level that had been made on the Austrian level before. Parliamentarians believe that they are much more qualified to participate in political decision making than ordinary citizens. In addition, they fear a lasting loss of power for the political elite when supporting e-democracy. But the main driver for interfering with the further evolution of e-democracy appears to be fear of change. These possibly true motivations are generally much more distinct in older democracies than in younger democracies. While some countries have experienced and strengthened democratic traditions and institutions for at least three generations or even longer (e.g., the United Kingdom), the Eastern European countries had to establish and secure a democratic development within a much shorter period. Naturally, parliamentarians in the 25 EU countries draw on very different extrinsic and intrinsic democratic values, some of them having lived under communist dictatorship for the majority of their lifetime. Observing the differences between the parliamentarians' main interest in power, influence, and control in Western Europe and improvement of economic conditions in Eastern Europe provides good examples for different democratic values.
Given these insights and based on our findings, we want to add a new conjecture linked to the middleman paradox. The longer democratic institutions in a country have been established, the less support for changing these institutions will be provided by politicians.
Finally, we wanted to note that, even without explicitly covering aspects of political morale during our research, it seems quite obvious that our findings are interconnected to these aspects, as one set of interests will be served above all others; that is, the interests of those actually in charge (Schumpeter, 1942) .
The concept of democracy is more than 2,500 years old but may not be static. Rather, it may demand dynamic adaptability (Hurley, 1999) . For polyarchal democracies, it may prove essential to adapt its current democratic institutions in order to successfully face the challenges ahead. The gap between democratic ideals and democratic realities, already large, will grow even greater if democracies fail to rise to , Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited. these challenges (Dahl, 1998; Held, 1999) . E-democracy concepts offer a lot of ideas to avoid this gap. The ideas are not only about direct participation in decision making, but also are about more democratic inclusion in general, drawing on concepts of deliberation and more participatory politics (Åström, 2001) .
Regardless of which scenario of edemocracy would be introduced, it would require the support of the political elites. Naturally, without their cooperation and commitment, a reform of democratic institutions is impossible to achieve. Considering our research findings, the notion of the middleman paradox may apply not only on the further evolution of e-democracy, but on the further evolution of democracy as well. To speak to the forthcoming White Paper of the Council of Europe (2004) on the future of democracy in Europe, "The key problem will be finding the will to reform existing rules with the very rulers who have benefited by them and who usually cannot be compelled to do so by an overriding external threat to their security or tenure in office."
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The findings that are presented in this paper suffer from the usual limitations of interpretative case studies in terms of generalization. As with any empirical investigation, our methodology and procedures affect our findings. Two limitations, in particular, should be mentioned. First, our observations could not be compared with an extensive pool of knowledge of previously consolidated findings, as we wanted to engage in theory-building in an area in which there has been relatively little prior research. Second, the data utilized in this study were collected exclusively within the European Union. Even though these 25 parliaments may be representative of others throughout the world, this is by no means certain. As a result of these limitations, our findings should be approached with some amount of skepticism. However, further interdisciplinary investigation of the middleman paradox and of the politicians' ambiguous roles for the future of democracy seems appropriate. For a final thought, we note that further research on the notion of the middleman paradox should also focus on the underlying conditions that are forcing democracies to change its institutions as well as making such changes possible at all.
